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Happy Birthday Biff!

If you weren't born this year though....were you born last year then? Or are you going to be born next year?

I think androidgeoff had the best approach but Bosco summed it up best. Seeing that many Clowns on one screen is scary.

aww! thanks everyone for the love, this made my day! been working on a 20 page paper all day otherwise. And I'll post it here when I'm done to make it the longest post (so far) on the forum. wonder what will happen...

Happy birthday dude!

(sorry just a straightforward message from me hehe)

happy birthday biff.

Hey [addimage]http://site.steelcit...s.com/biff2.jpg[/addimage], old boy! Happy belated! Hope you'll have lots of fun with your new Almanac!

Btw, hope you'll get your Polysix work again!

ok here it is, not yet proofed but a party-favor to all those who decided to attend the born-again Biff topic:

Race and Gender Discrimination in the New Car Market

by

Biff

Politics 190J - Brown, Michael.

03/20/2008

The structure of the new car market holds many peculiar characteristics to it that make it unique to any other investment. Purchases are made through a system of structured prices which can be negotiated downwards. Final prices vary amongst each other greatly and are dependent on the seller, the buyer, what negotiation strategies are used, and willingness of the two parties to bargain. Sellers practice a very delicate art in which a large amount of their earning come from, thereby giving them incentive to take every opportunity to charge more for a car. In order to see what prices can be negotiated out of a customer, sellers have been shown to rely on questioning, finding customer needs, and taking physical characteristics. Through the studies presented in this paper, data concludes that sellers use gender and race as important factors in what price they attempt to negotiate. Since new car purchases are the largest investments to buying a house, this subject has great significance to civil rights.#

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This paper will present an exhaustive overview of all current major studies done in measuring discrimination against consumers in the car market. Unfortunately, the amount of research that has been done is small and limited in variety, however, studies have presented undisputable results of differential treatment. The first two sections of this paper will discuss the methodologies used in measuring discrimination, what results have come from these tests, and potential criticism of their structure and/or results. The third section purposes what research needs to be done in order to give elasticity to the findings. The final section discusses the legal implications for differential treatment.

Two methodologies have been used to record racial discrimination in new car purchases. First, audit testings have been done to test discrimination on first-person basis, where characteristics of the buyers can be controlled, thereby eliminating any differences. These experiments, which will be discussed in further detail later, provide information on the micro-scale and offer indisputable evidence of discrimination occurring. This approach has been used in two separate experiments by Ayres (1991) and Ayres & Siegelman (1995)#. The second approach used for recording discrimination has been survey-based analysis, which has consisted of using data from surveys based on prices paid for car, race, and other details. Only one survey has been done through this approach (Goldberg 1996).

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Given the small number of surveys done to measure price discrimination, there is still much territory needed to be covered in measuring the extent that race and gender play in purchasing a new car. Also, many variables, such as location, social status, and bargaining strategies have not been thoroughly tested, given the limited number of approaches that have been conducted. Fortunately, of the limited scale of research that has been done, the data collected is extremely specific and in itself gives good direction for where studies in this field should go.

I. Audit-Based Methodology

Ian Ayres has been behind all of the current audit-based testings in car negotiation/purchases. His works have provided an extensively detailed and precise way to measure disparate treatment amongst race and gender in attempting to negotiate the price of a car. Each of his works have followed the same basic approach, but expanding the number of testers, car models, and dealerships each time to assure the numbers reflect a large pool of micro-scale data.

All the testers in these surveys were of similar age, with only a 4 year range per publication. All surveys were conducted in Chicago and the neighboring suburbs. Testers were assigned to tell sellers, when asked, that they had three to four years of college education, lived in an upper class area, and worked as an urban professional.# The tests involved pairing of two individuals who would be assigned to go to the same car

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dealership within a few days of each other. In every pair, one of the members was a white male as a base to measure disparate treatment against the other member, who was either a white female, black male, or black female. In the original survey (1991) 3 white males, 1 white female, 1 black male, and one black female were assigned to conduct the 180 negotiations. Seeing this as a potential flaw in the survey, the latter tests included more testers of both races and gender. The testers were unaware that the survey was measuring effects of race and gender in the Ayres (1995) and Ayres & Siegelman (1996) surveys, to assure this awareness didn’t distort the results. Testers were all selected to be of similar subjective attractiveness and wear clothing that implied similar social status.

When testers went to the car dealerships, they were all assigned to follow the same script and bargaining strategies, which assured that the seller was initiating questions and was in control of the majority of the interaction.# Testers were assigned to focus on a particular car model to insure consistency in all of the results. The Ayres & Siegelman (1995) survey extended the number of car models, however the all were in similar price range. If sellers tried to guide the testers towards a different model, the testers were to tell the sellers they were only interested in the assigned model.

Negotiation strategies were based around testers counter offering the seller’s initial price with that of the estimated marginal cost.# Following this offer, testers were assigned one of two different negotiation strategies. In some of the surveys, negotiations

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were approached by a “split-the-difference” strategy. If, for example the tester offered $11,000 on a car and the seller counter-offered $13,000, the next step would be for the seller to respond with $12,000. In the original Ayers (1991) survey this was the only negotiation method used. The second method added on to later tests was a “fixed-concession” strategy to assure results didn‘t reflect the negotiation strategy. This approach involved the tester continually countering the seller’s offer with their original offer plus 20%. Through out all surveys, testers were assigned to wait 5 minutes before making a counter-offer. Both strategies were used until the seller agreed to the offer or refused any further negotiation.

Results for Audit-Based Testings

The two audit-based tests yield relatively similar results of disparate treatment along racial lines. Questions asked to testers and the general approach of sellers followed relatively different paths. Final offers too were different along the auditor’s race and gender. Race ultimately played a more significant role than gender in determining final offers.

The two tests produced different ordering of who paid the highest costs. In the original survey, black females were reported as paying a higher rate than black males or white females. In the Ayres & Siegelman (1995) survey, however, black males received the highest final offers. Below is a chart of the final profits that sellers would receive on their final offers to the testers:

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The Ayres & Siegelman (1995) survey reveals higher average markup rate across the board, with the notable exception being black females. Gender appears to have the same difference in both studies, with profits not varying too significantly for white females as they did for black females.

Data collected in the Ayres & Siegelman (1995) survey is likely to be a more reliable source for determining discrimination levels. In the Ayres (1991) survey, only one person was used in each group (excluding white males, of which there were three). Thus it is likely that the results of the survey could have been effected by the individuals of these groups.# Second, Ayres & Siegelman acknowledged this potential flaw and attempted to measure whether individuals of a race and gender group were treated differently than others in their category. Their findings indicate that individuals remained consistent to their counterparts.# Since the Ayres & Siegelman (1995) survey was a double-blind test, this may help explain why there were overall higher prices offered.

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Both negotiating strategies used by testers appeared to yield the same results of discrimination. Strategies used by sellers in both test reveal that the seller’s rate of concession remains fairly structured. Meaning, if the sellers first offer was relatively high, then their final offer would remain high too.

Disparate treatments were not only apparent in the seller’s offer, but also in their questions and sales approach. The Ayres (1991) survey recorded the following strategies used by sellers:

Sellers attempted to use gas mileage and reliability as sales pitches to females of both races.

Sellers would often guide the testers to a sales representative of their gender and race, who would give them a more expensive offer.#

Black males were more often offered the sticker price by sellers.

Both black males and white females were more often asked whether they had been to other dealerships. #

When females asked the sellers whether or not they knew the marginal cost of the car, sellers gave white females an average of $1046 higher than what reports had indicated in the 42 times they were willing to disclose

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this information.# Black females were always told by sellers that they didn’t know the price.

These strategies indicate that sellers do not approach customers identically and instead look for cues. A large part of these strategies are based visible features such as race and gender to give direction to the sellers’ strategies. Both the Ayres (1991) and Ayres & Siegelman (1995) surveys never reveal to the sellers that they were part of a test and therefore the intentions and motivations of sellers are uncertain. There is also the possibility that had sellers been later interviewed about their strategies that they would’ve likely not disclosed their strategy or not been aware of it.

Two broad theories are used to explain disparate treatment amongst customers in Ayers (1991) and Ayres & Siegelman (1995): animus-based and statistical based theories. Animus discrimination is based on the ideas created by Gary Becker# that theorize sellers charge more because of a dislike towards certain groups. Several instances in the Ayres (1991) survey did reveal undisputed bigotry towards non-white male testers in several extreme circumstances:

In one extreme case a salesperson angrily told a black tester, ‘You should walk fast to your car because blacks aren’t welcome here.’ Additionally, sales people said things like, “You are a pretty girl, so I’ll give you a great deal.” or made explicit sexual references such as, “We can’t drop our pants until it’s paid for.” Many of these sorts of comments were made following the conclusion of bargaining, after the sales person had failed to make a sale.#

Such remarks might be good indicators animosity, in which the seller looses control of

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their professional manner after frustration of failing to make a sale.

Animus theories of discrimination are divided up into 3 sections, in which each explains animosity existing in different regions. Owner Animus exists in cases where owners of dealerships appear to hold prejudices. This theory does not seem to likely because it would imply that owner would not hire non-white employees and that black testers would receive better discounts at minority-owned dealerships, which was not true.# The second form of animosity was Employee Animus, in which the employees of the dealerships were pervasive. The Ayres (1991) example above certainly points to that, however, as previously mentioned sellers of the same race and gender as the tester appeared to give the worst discounts. Furthermore, the Ayers & Siegelman (1995) survey found little relevance of seller race to final price.# The third form of animosity was Customer Animus in which the customers are believed to have dislike towards blacks and women. This theory does not hold as much potential as the other two, because as Ayres & Siegelman point out if sellers though their customers held a prejudice, they would attempt to rush them out. The opposite in fact held true, because negotiation periods were shortest with white men.#

Statistical-based theories focus more on the seller’s will to maximize profits through approaching each race and gender differently. The differences in how seller’s treated the customers in the Ayres (1991) survey, as bulleted above, are a strong indicator of statistical discrimination. These disparate approaches indicate, for example, that sellers

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perceive gas mileage as important to women. Statistical-based discrimination falls into two broad categories.

Bargaining-Cost-Based Statistical Discrimination assumes that certain groups have a higher dislike to bargaining that others. In other words, sellers exploit certain groups alleged aversion to keep prices high. Black testers, for example, were more likely to have managers “bump” up the seller’s final offer on a car than on white males (7 percent compared to 1.5 percent).#

The second form of statistical discrimination was Reservation-Price-Based Statistical Discrimination, in which sellers assess how much they think they can sell the customer a car for. This form of discrimination is practically acknowledged by the fact that sellers use the term “qualify the buyer” for price assessment.# This involves asking particular questions around subjects like the customer’s history in finding a car or whether or not they’ll be trading in a used car. This approach of sellers is essentially universal, however, how they go about “qualifying the buyer” indicates different strategies. Ayers & Siegelman (1995) divide reservation-price-based statistical discrimination into two sub-categories the seller may use:#

1. Search Costs: Difficulty a customer might have in searching for a new car. The higher the search cost, the less likely the customer will go to several dealerships. Ayres (2001) observes that black customers may be

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seen as having high search costs because of no mode of transportation.# Testers that were not white males were in fact 2.5 times more likely to be asked their how they got to the dealership.#

2. Consumer Information: Beliefs about particular groups play an important role in the sellers bargaining approach. Surveys about which race and gender groups are aware that the price of a car is negotiable plays an essential role. As previously mentioned, the Ayres (1991) test found that black males were more often offered the sticker price. Ayres and Siegelman (1995) note that a study by the Consumer Federation of America (1991) found that blacks were twice as likely as whites to not know the car price is negotiable.#

Criticism for Audi-Based Testing

The two audit-based tests have advantages to them that make the data precise, however narrow. These surveys thoroughly measure discrimination, however, they over simplify the practices and procedures of buying a new car. The issue is far more complex and is comprised of many variable that need to be taken into consideration. First, did certain procedures of the testers disrupt the process from following real life negotiations? In other words, the two forms of negotiation could have been too structured to properly reflect how individuals (when they are aware they can negotiate the price) approach

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buying a car.#

Second, the audit-tests exclude different payment methods, which in itself can be a good indicator of how much profit’s the seller believes they can extract. Since auditors were assigned to tell the sellers that they were not trading in a car, this could’ve cued the seller to charge more. It is, of course, apparent that blacks and to a lesser extent females receive different prices, but does this gap of discrimination increase or decrease if the all testers were financing the car or trading one in? Since sellers can charge a higher price on cars when they are financed, it would be likely that the gap (and possibly ratio) would increase too.

The test only measures racial discrimination between white and black customers. The next logical step would be to include other race/ethnicities into the surveys to give more concrete evidence of discrimination. Further detail of downfalls of these testings will be discussed later in collaboration with the survey-based testings.

II. Survey-Based Methodology

Only one major survey-based analysis has been conducted with regards to discrimination in purchases of new cars. This was done by Pinelopi K. Goldberg in 1996, following the Ayres (1991) and Ayres & Siegelman (1995) audit-based survey. This survey provided several advantages over the audit tests. The amount of data accumulated

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into this survey was greater,# covering far more variables, and displaying real life results for comparison expanding a 4 year period. Unlike the audit tests, Goldberg’s findings did not adhere to a strict bargaining strategy and instead observed how people will actually act in purchase of a new car.

Data for compiling Goldberg’s work was from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) from the years 1983 to 1987. This information is collaborated with the Automotive News Market Data Book to give suggested retail prices. The numbers for this survey are reached in a relatively different manner than the audit-based surveys. Rather than calculating markup prices from marginal costs up to indicate price differences, this survey calculated down from discounts of sticker price to compare results. This switch in approach was made because market prices for the variety of cars was difficult to obtain.#

Results for Survey-Based Testing

The Goldberg survey found fairly different results than both of the audit-based tests. The findings show far less discrimination than was found in Ayres & Siegelman. The results did indicate some variation amongst race, but results for gender appear to be relatively similar.. Explanation of these different results will be discussed in further detail later.

Goldberg’s findings for black and white females coincides with what Ayres & Siegelman found. White females on average paid $100 more, while black females paid

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was roughly $426.# This amount, Goldberg argues, is statistically insignificant. Her findings for black males, however, deviates greatly from the Ayres & Siegelman findings. Her results indicated that non-white males# only pay an average of $274 more than white males, as compared to $1,100 found in the other survey. Goldberg tries to explain the possibility for different results in three ways:

1. Selective Patronage: Customers are able to compare stores and not necessarily be required to purchase from one store. As Ayres & Siegelman observes, search costs play an important factor in the customer’s ability to find lower prices. Goldberg acknowledges that the data in her survey does not permit this theory to be thoroughly detailed because the information is not available.

2. Limited Groups: The findings for the survey only include households that purchase new cars. One possibility is that groups subjected to discrimination ultimately did not purchase a new car and were therefore excluded from the CES data.# Both Goldberg and Ayers & Siegelman’s surveys do not equate deterrence of potential buyers into the model. Meaning, if people feel like they will be subjected to discrimination, they might not attempt to buy new, dealership owned cars.# Further studies are

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needed in this area.

3. Bargaining Strategies: This should be one of the most significant explanations in pricing differences amongst the groups. The Ayres & Siegelman survey uses only 2 bargaining strategies and is based off of the assumption that the buyer is not trading in a car. Second, bargaining for a new car is likely to be influence by trading in a used car and possible negotiations that arise from combining the two.#

Criticism for Survey-Based Testing

Where or not the data provided in Goldberg’s survey can even be compared to that of Ayres and Ayres & Siegelman is a matter of question. In Goldberg’s publication, she admits that the audit tests hold “enormous credibility,”# yet she goes on to prove through the CES that actual results vary significantly in some cases.

First, there are greatly disproportional numbers representing each group. Of the 1,279 people reported in the survey, only 39 minority males were included and 28 minority females, comprising 5% of the pool of data.# This actually leads to the Ayres & Siegelman survey as having a larger pool of non-white negotiations. Ayres notes that Goldberg’s results:

But with so few observations on the individual races, it is hardly surprising that Goldberg was unable to produce statistically significant results. Indeed the aggregation of multiple races combined with the small number of observations by itself could easily explain Goldberg’s inability to produce

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statistically significant minority coefficients.#

This corresponds to the second notable problem of Goldberg’s work: over-abundance of variables. The audit-based surveys had the advantage of being able to control the characteristics of the testers. This assured that the only difference of each audit would be the customer’s race and gender. Orley Ashenfelter criticizes the CES data as being too “noisy.”# Clear results cannot be made with out taking other variables into consideration. Thus being between a small number of minority car purchases and an overwhelming amount of data, clear inferences cannot be derived about race and gender discrimination.

III. Further Research in Car-Sales Discrimination

As explained previously, purchasing a car has many significant details to consider. The disparate treatment of gender and race can only be meet once all standards outside of these are identical. This was the advantage of audit tests and shortcoming of the survey test. However, comparing the current audit and survey tests becomes a matter of “quality versus quantity.” Thus in order to obtain better results for future findings, studies must find a balance amongst the two.

Further studies should approach measuring discrimination through the Ayres & Siegelman model of audit-based studies, but with more emphasis placed on these variables:

1. Negotiation Strategies: As mentioned previously, a downfall of both the

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audit and survey test is their limited embrace of bargaining strategies. The Ayres & Siegelman research only used two negotiation strategies in approaching the seller. The Ayres (1991) survey reveals an ample amount of information with regards to sellers trying to exploit potential ignorance of certain types of customers through their initial offers, eliminating the need for much more research on this area of disparate treatment.# The Goldberg survey likely contains multiple strategies of negotiation, however the CES does not record this.

2. Means of Payment: Certain types of payment methods may invoke different feelings in the sellers, causing them to finalize at different prices. The Ayres (1991) and Ayres & Siegelman (1995) surveys have all of the auditors tell sellers (when asked) that they can pay upfront. This may motivate sellers to attempt to charge more on cars, because they know they will ultimately not make as much profit as financiers. Second, trading in used cars might be seen by seller as an opportunity to hold higher prices on car. These two factors should be further researched together and separately.

3. Car Make and Models: The seller’s willingness to negotiate a car may be largely motivated by radicalized and gendered standards of pairing up certain groups with certain cars. If these presumptions are broken by

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customers stepping out of these standards it may cause a chain reaction of events to create higher prices. First, if the seller tries to direct a customer towards certain models or features assumed to appeal to them.# If, however, the customer asserts their interest in one particular car over the others suggested, it make cue the seller to believe the customer is set on the model and thereby more submissive in bargaining. Also, certain pricing ranges might create a larger proportional difference in final offers, similar to that of financing. If sellers assume that affluent customers of a particular race or gender spend more frivolously, it would likely result in them raising their offers.

4. Customer Appearance: One important part of the Ayres (1991) and Ayres & Siegelman (1995) survey was making sure the auditors were identical in all qualities outside of race and gender.# Auditors were young and made to adhere to a more yuppie appearance in their clothing and occupation. Further surveys might want to change the ages and appearances of their auditors to discredit factors outside of race and gender. The two audit surveys likely chose the yuppie appearance because of the vulnerability of the customer combined with the higher-end social status, making them ideal prey for sellers. Based off of CRT studies, appearances may strike certain emotions and assumptions that further

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research to attempt to measure. Could making customers even wealthier in appearance create a wider range of disparate treatment? Do wealthy female or black customers trigger more resentment in sellers which later is seen in offers?

5. Pairing of Customers: The Goldberg survey begged the question of what effect couples play on car negotiations. This was because the car purchases were categorized by households and not the individuals who actually bought the car. Many different variables can be measured in this category, therefore, it might be necessary to simply test what final prices a female auditor receives compared to a coupled in which either the male or female was the primary negotiator. This variable also opens the possibility of measuring disparate treatment with regard to sexual orientation. Would, for example, a heterosexual couple receive a better discount over an

individual female or homosexual female couple?

IV. Legal Implications for Disparate Treatment

While prejudice might be easy to prove in car sales, it is much more difficult to create any sort of protection or follow with legal actions once this has occurred. As it has been stressed previously, there are many complicated variables that go into buying a car. These characteristics further the difficulty of extracting racism in a non-controlled setting.

First, bargaining is one of the blind spot on civil rights is not found in any of the laws. Since prices can vary greatly between two white males as much as between a black

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and white male, there is always going to be a large amount of anecdotal evidence in the act. Car dealerships rely on the sellers to apply their own skills to making a profit. This means many cases, that individuals are held responsible.

Supreme Court rulings have created and reinforced to put burden of proof of the accuser. In Washington v. Davis, the court ruled that radicalized results of an allegedly non-racial procedure indicates no wrong has occurred. This makes it difficult to bring forth any accusations with out them being easily dismissed. Charles R. Lawrence III summarized this ruling making non-blatant form of racisms allowed:

…A motive-centered doctrine of racial discrimination places a very heavy, and often impossible, burden of persuasion on the wrong side of the dispute. Improper motives are easy to hide. And because behavior results from interaction of a multitude of motives, [defendants] will always be able to argue that racially neutral considerations prompted their actions.#

Ayres (2001) discusses a class action lawsuit in Atlanta, Georgia where overt racism did occur, but proving the case still required discrediting many factors that can be used for justifying different prices amongst white and black customers. The lawsuit was brought against one specific car dealership in which former employees admitted to being trained to mark up cars towards black customers. Even with this admitted, the case still had to show wholesale prices, sticker prices, and the negotiations between the two. Second, many of the black customers financed their car, which as previously mentioned involvers higher mark up, which required calculating the average profits on them over white

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purchases.#

As of now, more research is needed to provide definitive evidence of discrimination in car purchases. This is far more difficult that housing discrimination and therefore needs to be treated differently. Once racially motivated levels of discrimination have been proven through several test and discrediting the multiple number of variables, legal action in policy change will be more possible. Even so, however, there is still the uphill battle of getting such protection turned into a law with the widely held notion that civil rights law have covered over every aspect of life.

Oh and work cited:

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Strauss, David A. “Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown” The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 56, No. 3. (Summer 1989): 935-1015.

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“US Supreme Court: WASHINGTON v. DAVIS, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)

426 U.S. 229.” 08 March 2008. Thomas Business.

A-, suppose that's good since I did get a lot of sleep the night before this paper was due and ate some nang birthday cake

Happy birthday! I am a week late! I am also fired for that! But happy birthday anyway. Have fun being born next year.